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I.  Introduction 
 
At virtually any pharmacy, grocery store, or convenience store, one can purchase 
“cold tablets” that contain more than one active ingredient. The main components of 
these medicines are pain relievers, decongestants, antihistamines, and cough 
suppressants. Tablets (or other dosage forms) containing just one of the ingredients are 
also available. The tablets that contain more than one active ingredient are therefore 
examples of bundled products.
1  This chapter reports an empirical analysis of the effects 
of this bundling.  
Bundling and the related practice of tying have been central to several high-
profile antitrust cases around the turn of the 21
st century in both the United States and 
Europe.
2  The broad policy issue raised by these cases is how to distinguish 
                                                 
1 A bundled product is one that combines more than one product that could be sold separately. 
2 U.S. v. Microsoft and New York, et al. v. Microsoft, Civil Action Nos. 98–1232 and 98–1233 (TPJ), July 
17, 1998; In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., No. 96-CV-5238, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4965, 
at 6 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2003); Commission Decision of 24.03.2004 (Case COMP/C-3/37.792 – Microsoft), 
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf  (accessed April 
25, 2005); Apple is facing a host of antitrust lawsuits in Europe and the United States over its alleged tying 
of iPod and the iTunes music store. In November 2004, Conseil de la Concurrence, the French competition 
authority,  dismissed a suit brought by Virgin against Apple asking the French government to compel 
Apple to license Fairplay, its DRM technology. See, Apple Conseil de la Concurrence, Décision n° 04-D-
54 relative à des pratiques mises en oeuvre par la société Apple Computer, Inc. dans les secteurs du 
téléchargement de musique sur Internet et des baladeurs numériques, 9 November 2004. In 2005, a French 
consumer group launched  another lawsuit against Apple and Sony’s proprietary music formats, claiming 
that the respective digital rights management used by both companies, which prevent songs bought from 
their online music stores from being played on other manufacturers' media players is limiting consumers’ 
choice. See Jo Best, “Apple, Sony sued over DRM in France,” Silicon.com, February 14, 2005, 
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9588_22-5575417.html  (accessed April 25, 2005). Apple is also facing a 
similar antitrust lawsuit in the United States. See Peter Cohen , “iTunes user sues Apple over FairPlay 
DRM,”  MacCentral, January 26, 2005, http://www.macworld.com/news/2005/01/06/slattery/index.php  Preliminary – Do not redistribute or cite without permission 
anticompetitive cases of bundling and tying from the bundling and tying that occurs 
commonly under competition, presumably because it is efficient.  Making that distinction 
requires a better understanding of bundling and tying under competition than the existing 
literature provides.  This chapter is part of a project to advance our understanding of 
bundling and tying under competition both theoretically and empirically. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  The following two sections 
provide background for our analysis.  In section II, we discuss the antitrust treatment of 
bundling and tying, which is the policy issue that motivates our analysis.  Section III 
briefly describes what we view as the principle shortcomings of the existing economics 
literature on bundling and tying and offers a new framework that we propose in order to 
address those shortcomings.   
Sections IV-VI then present our analysis of the bundling of cold medicines and 
pain relievers.  Section IV describes the data and establishes three main empirical 
regularities.  First, the discounts for buying bundled products are substantial.  Second, so 
are the discounts for buying products in larger package sizes.  Third, some products come 
in different dosages.  For example, acetaminophen is sold as regular strength (325 
milligrams), extra strength (500 milligrams), and arthritis strength (650 milligrams).  
Holding package size constant, the cost per unit of active ingredient is lower for higher 
dosages.  Qualitatively, none of these results is surprising; our contribution lies in 
quantifying them.   
Section V shows how to apply the framework described in Section III to the 
bundle discount.  Under that theory, a bundle discount can be the result of two distinct 
                                                                                                                                                 
(accessed April 25, 2005).  Also see, Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Hillenbrand Indus., 262 F. Supp. 2d 722 
(W.D. Tex. 2003).   
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cost effects.  One is marginal cost savings (that could arise, for example, from conserving 
on the number of packages and tablets produced). The other is a reduction in the 
contribution to fixed costs of each product offering (such as the cost of a shelf slot or the 
system cost of an additional stock keeping unit).  As we will explain,
3 whether the private 
savings consumers get from the bundle reflect social savings as well depends on the 
relative contribution of each.  Thus, to estimate cost savings from bundling, we must 
empirically identify these two effects. 
The key empirical contributions in the paper are presented in Section VI, which 
we summarize in some detail here to motivate the analysis. We exploit the regularities in 
the pricing of different package sizes to identify the marginal cost savings and fixed cost 
increase effects.  Some economists might argue that this pricing should be viewed as an 
optimal quantity-dependent pricing scheme.  We suggest the alternative hypothesis that it 
reflects the same cost factors that give rise to discounts for bundled products.  Suppose, 
for example, that a particular medicine––acetaminophen––is available in packages of 50, 
100, and 200 tablets, with the price per tablet a decreasing function of tablet size.  There 
seems to be no reason to rule out the possibility that some customers would ideally like to 
purchase 150 tablets.  Such a customer could either buy one package of 100 tablets and 
one of 50 tablets, thus sacrificing potential economies of package size, or one package of 
200 tablets that contains 50 more tablets than he wants. We estimate how high fixed costs 
would have to be to make it unprofitable to offer package sizes that we do not observe. 
As a basis for these estimates, we extend the model discussed in Section III to package-
size effects. 
                                                 
3 See Section III. 
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We estimate that, in this case, the marginal cost savings from bundled products 
exceed the fixed costs of the product offerings, so bundling lowers costs. For example, 
we estimate that the price of a package of 48 tablets that combines two active ingredients 
is $3.60 less
4 than the sum of the prices of the same ingredients sold in separate packages 
of 48 tablets each. We decompose this $3.60 into a marginal cost increment of $2.40 and 
an average fixed cost of $1.20. The net cost effect is the difference between the two, or 
$1.20. The gain would be substantially larger for tablets that contain three active 
ingredients. Moreover, these cost effects do not capture the value of the convenience 
consumers get from bundled products. 
We can also use our framework to estimate the cost savings from having the 
separate products available rather than having consumers who want just one component 
buy the bundled product. This type of calculation is important for addressing the policy 
issues associated with the antitrust laws concerning tying. Tying occurs when a bundled 
product is offered and at least one of the separate products is not. Since tying can be an 
antitrust violation, the law encourages companies, at least those with market power, to 
offer the products that it bundles as separate goods as well. For a consumer who wants 
just one component of a bundle, buying the separate component rather than the bundle 
saves the marginal cost of the components he does not want. However, the separate 
component is itself a distinct product that generates a fixed cost of offering it. Selling the 
separate component only saves costs if the fixed cost is less than marginal costs avoided 
by not providing a customer with the part of a bundle he does not want. 
                                                 
4 The percentage difference would vary with the active ingredients but would generally be between 30 
percent and 50 percent. 
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While in most of the cases we consider our estimates indicate that the separate 
products save costs, there is one case in which we estimate that it does not. Of course, 
this result does not imply that the separate product should not be offered. In the example 
we consider, consumers who want, for example, just pain relief, would strictly prefer not 
to have to take a decongestant at the same time. Just as a complete welfare analysis of 
bundling and tying would have to account for the convenience value of the bundle for 
consumers who want all the components, so would it also have to account for the 
possibility that some consumers would pay not to have a component of a bundle.   
The concluding section argues that the approach we have developed in this 
chapter can and should be used more generally to examine the economics of bundling 
specifically, and possible efficiency explanations for various business practices that are 
often found suspect under the antitrust laws. 
 
II.  Policy  Background 
 
The policy issue that motivates our analysis is the antitrust treatment of bundling 
and tying.  Bundling is the practice of selling in combination two or more goods that 
could be sold separately.  Tying occurs when a firm sells a bundled product but does not 
sell one of the components individually.  “Mixed bundling” arises when a firm sells all 
the components separately but offers a discount for the bundled product.  In principle, it 
is tying rather than bundling that has historically raised antitrust concerns.
5  However, a 
                                                 
5 See Philip Areeda and Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and 
Their Application (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1978). 
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sufficiently large bundle discount is sometimes interpreted as a virtual tie, and mixed 
bundling has emerged as an issue in its own right in Europe.
6     
Courts in the European Community and in the United States have found that tying 
should be treated with almost as little doubt as price fixing.  In both cases the courts have 
decided that the offense is unlawful per se.  That is, the courts do not need to inquire 
much, if at all, into the competitive effects of the practice or give much weight to pro-
competitive justifications.  In the United States, tying is the only unilateral practice for 
which the courts have not incorporated microeconomic reasoning, following in the 
tradition established by certain economists and legal schools associated with the 
University Chicago.
7 
                                                 
6 See John Kallaugher and Brian Sher, “Rebates Revisited: Anti-Competitive Effects and Exclusionary 
Abuse Under Article 82,” European Competition Law Review 25(5) (2004): 263-285; Hans-Georg Kamann 
and Ellen Bergmann, “The Granting of Rebates by Market Dominant Undertakings under Article 82 of the 
EC Treaty,” European Competition Law Review 26(2) (2005): 83-89.   
7 See David S. Evans and A. Jorge Padilla, “Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing Unilateral Practices: 
A Neo-Chicago Approach,” University of Chicago Law Review (Forthcoming, 2005).  
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A. European Community Tying Law 
 
In the European Community, Hilti is one of the two leading cases on tying (the 
other being Tetra Pak II).
8   Hilti made nail guns used for construction work.  The nail 
guns at the time of the case used separate cartridges and nails.  Hilti had patents on the 
cartridges for use in its guns.  It required customers buying its cartridges to also buy its 
nails.  Cartridges and nails are obviously used in fixed proportions.  The European Court 
of Justice, affirming a decision by the Court of First Instance, agreed that this was an 
unlawful tie because Hilti was dominant in cartridges and cartridges and nails were 
separate products. 
Economists recognize this case as a straightforward application of the Chicago 
single-monopoly profit theorem.
9  With fixed proportions there is only one possible 
monopoly profit.  Hilti can earn all of its monopoly profits from the cartridges and is 
therefore indifferent, on this basis at least, on whether it sells the nail at a competitive 
price or someone else does.  Price discrimination and metering for the intensity of use of 
the nail gun cannot explain the practice either since the cartridges suffice for that. Thus, 
Hilti’s explanation that there were safety issues seems more persuasive than a 
monopolization story. 
                                                 
8 Case C-53/92P Hilti AG v. Commission [1994] ECRI-667; Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval v. Commission, 
2002 E.C.R. II-4382. 
9 Aaron Director and Edward H Levi, "Law and the Future: Trade Regulation," Northwestern University 
Law Review 51 (May-June 1956): 281-96. Also see, Jean Tirole,  The Theory Of Industrial Organization 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1988).  
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B. U.S. Tying Law 
In the United States, tying law is based on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Jefferson Parish.
10  A hospital had an exclusive contract with a group of anesthesiologists 
and required surgical patients to use one of those anesthesiologists. A competing 
anesthesiologist claimed this was an unlawful tie.  The Supreme Court enunciated a new 
test for tying that was somewhat more forgiving than the earlier ones.  A tie was unlawful 
if there were two separate products, a firm with market power in one product required 
customers to take the other product, and this requirement affects a not-insubstantial 
amount of interstate commerce.  Two products were separate if there was enough 
consumer demand for the tied product to offer it separately. 
The Supreme Court agreed with the appeals court that surgical and anesthesiology 
services were separate products. The record showed that many anesthesiologists were not 
employed by hospitals; patients--women having babies for example-- sometimes hire 
their own anesthesiologists. The appeals court had rejected a number of arguments 
presented by the hospital that there were efficiencies from having an exclusive contract 
with a group of anesthesiologists.  The Supreme Court nevertheless found that the tie was 
not unlawful because Jefferson Parish did not have market power.  That leads one to 
question the power of the test:  if the tie was not efficient, and if Jefferson Parish did not 
have market power to secure an extra monopoly profit, why did it engage in the tie in the 
first place? 
The situation is not quite as extreme in practice as it appears on paper.  Tying, 
unlike price fixing, is common and conducted by many companies quite openly.  MIT 
Press, for example, will not sell you this chapter without you also taking Tim 
8 Preliminary – Do not redistribute or cite without permission 
Bresnahan’s.  Competition authorities ignore many cases they could prosecute.  And the 
courts in the United States often find reasons to define tying away.
11  But companies that 
get caught up in tying cases find that these cases lead to significant changes in their 
businesses. 
In March 2004, the European Commission found that Microsoft had engaged in 
an unlawful tie by distributing Windows with media player technologies included without 
also offering Windows with media player technologies excluded.
12  To remedy this 
violation the Commission required Microsoft to distribute a version of Windows with 182 
media player related files deleted (although it has allowed Microsoft to distribute this at 
the same price as the complete version since media players are generally available for 
free).
13   
Microsoft also faced a claim brought by the U.S. Department of Justice that it tied 
its operating system to its browser.
14  A district court found that was illegal under the 
Jefferson Parish test.  An appeals court created a “software platform” exception to the 
standard per se test and remanded the case to be considered under the “rule of reason.”
15  
The Justice Department decided not to retry the charge.
16   
Microsoft is not the only company to face tying claims.  In April 2003, 
MasterCard and Visa settled a class-action case for $3 billion in cash and more in 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984). 
11 Compuware Corp. v. IBM,  259 F. Supp. 2d 597 ( E.D. Mich., 2003). 
12 Commission Decision of 24.03.2004 (Case COMP/C-3/37.792 – Microsoft), at ¶¶ 792-993.  
13 Id., at ¶¶ 1011-23. 
14 U.S. v. Microsoft and New York, et al. v. Microsoft, Civil Action Nos. 98–1232 and 98–1233 (TPJ), July 
17, 1998. 
15 U.S. v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), at 158. 
16 The appeals court in another part of the decision found that the government had failed to prove the 
existence of a browser market and precluded it from retrying that portion of the case.  That made it 
especially difficult for the Justice Department to proceed under a rule of reason analysis since it needed to 
demonstrate harm in the browser market. 
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concessions after a district court judge found, on summary judgment and before a jury 
trial on the facts, that the card associations had passed most, and possibly all, of the tests 
necessary for finding an unlawful tie.
17  The card association required merchants that 
accepted their credit cards to also take their debit cards (as part of a general rule known 
as the “honor-all-card rule”).  As part of the settlement, the card associations agreed to let 
merchants take credit cards without also taking debit cards.  American Express is facing a 
similar class-action lawsuit because it “ties” merchants’ acceptance of its corporate card 




Although it is not the focus of the analysis below, it should be mentioned that 
another strand of antitrust law in the European Community and the United States finds 
that what we have called mixed bundling can be anticompetitive.  The issue hinges on 
pricing.  At the simplest level, a company can offer choices but set the prices in such a 
way that it is equivalent to tying.  The more interesting case, though, involves setting 
prices for the various bundles in ways that arguably foreclose competitors from 
competing in certain product markets.  The Court of First Instance found in several cases 
that “fidelity discounts”—discounts that in effect encouraged firms to buy multiple 
products from a single firm—violated Article 82 EC Treaty.
19 
                                                 
17 In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., No. 96-CV-5238, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4965, at 6 
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2003);  Jennifer Bayot, “Final Pact Approved in Long-Running Debit Card Litigation,”  
New York Times, December 20, 2003.  
18 Merchant class action suit against American Express, Citigroup, and MBNA (New York, 2003); “Stop 
Me if You've Heard This One: Merchants Sue Card Company,” The Green Sheet, Inc., February 01, 2005, 
http://www.greensheet.com/PriorIssues-/050201-/7.htm (accessed April 25, 2005) . 
19 These included buying different types of tires (Case T-203/01, Manufacture française des pneumatiques 
Michelin v. Commision, Sept 30, 2003) and providing discounts to travel agents who used a particular 
airline (Case T-219/99, British Airways plc v. Commission, Dec. 7, 2003).  Coca Cola settled a related case 
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In the United States, in a controversial decision, the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed a jury verdict that found that 3M had violated the Sherman Act by 
providing discounts for purchasing several 3M products.  It did so apparently in the 
absence of any evidence that any of the individual prices were below marginal cost.
20  
 
III.  Economics Literature on Tying and Bundling 
 
In this section, we briefly comment on the existing economics literature on 
bundling and tying and then describe the alternative framework we have developed for 
understanding bundling and tying under competition. 
A. Existing Literature 
 
The economics literature on bundling and tying has largely been a normative one 
motivated by the antitrust issues.  The early legal hostility toward tying was based on 
informal notions that the practice could be used to leverage monopoly in one market into 
some other market.  George Stigler presented an alternative interpretation that gave rise 
to the price discrimination strand of the literature.  Then, starting with Whinston (1990), 
the literature has revisited the foreclosure theory using game theory as an analytic tool.  
We now understand that one can construct a formal economic model in which tying is 
used to exclude competitors. 
                                                                                                                                                 
with the European Commission by agreeing to eliminate various bundled discounts.  Commission Decision 
of 10/19/2004 (CASE COMP/39.116/B-2 – COCA-COLA). 
20See Daniel L. Rubinfeld, “3M's Bundling Rebates: An Economic Perspective,” Chicago Law Review 72 
(2005): 243-264. 
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Ironically, even though the intent of the literature has been to provide insight into 
antitrust policy, it has simply failed to address the most important issue policy makers 
need to confront.  Both tying and mixed bundling are common practices under 
competition.  The challenge for antitrust policy is to distinguish anticompetitive tying and 
bundling from the tying and bundling that commonly occurs under competition and is 
therefore presumed to be efficient.  The literature suffers from three major shortcomings 
that prevent it from achieving this task.  First, it is based on the assumption that firms 
have market power.  Second, it is based on the assumption that bundling and tying do not 
create efficiencies of any type, which is why bundling and tying occur under competition.  
Even at a theoretical level, one cannot distinguish between competitive tying and 
anticompetitive tying by understanding anticompetitive tying alone.  One needs to 
understand competitive tying as well to know the difference.  The third shortcoming of 
the literature is that it is almost entirely theoretical.   
The lack of empirical content is problematic for two distinct reasons.  First, courts 
cannot be expected to distinguish perfectly between competitive and anticompetitive 
examples of bundling and tying.  In light of the risk of error, the relative frequency of 
competitive and anticompetitive tying and bundling and the costs of “false convictions” 
and “false acquittals” are relevant considerations in formulating legal standards.
21  For 
the foreseeable future, notions of the relative frequencies will have to be subjective;
22 but 
careful observation of bundling and tying in practice would seem to be helpful and indeed 
essential in judging the probabilities.  Secondly, the economics literature has not 
                                                 
21 See Keith N. Hylton and Michael A. Salinger,  “Tying Law and Policy: A Decision Theoretic 
Approach,” Antitrust Law Journal 69 (2001): 469. 
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developed the analytical framework to do the cost-benefit analysis of actual cases in 
which tying and bundling help some customers but harm others. 
B. A New Framework 
 
In Evans and Salinger (2004, 2005), we present a new model of bundling and 
tying designed to address the shortcomings of the existing literature.  First, we examine 
these practices under competition and thereby provide a basis for comparing competitive 
and anticompetitive theories of these practices.  Second, while further development is 
needed, we believe that our framework has the potential to be more tractable for 
empirical analysis than existing models.  Indeed, the empirical analysis we present in this 
paper represents the first attempt to implement the model empirically. 
To understand tying under competition, one must first recognize that consumers 
differ in their preferences for what they want. Businesses cannot necessarily customize 
their offerings to provide each customer exactly what he wants.  A simple framework that 
captures this basic idea goes as follows.  There are two goods, A and B, which can be 
sold separately or in combination.  Some customers want just good A, some want just 
good B, and some want both.  Those who want both might strictly prefer to buy them in 
bundled form.  This could be because the bundling provides convenience, in which case 
they would be willing to pay a premium to buy the bundle rather than to buy the 
components separately.  Alternatively, bundling might save marginal costs, which, under 
competition, get passed on to consumers through lower prices. 
                                                                                                                                                 
22 See Warren S. Grimes,  “The Antitrust Tying Law Schism: A Critique of Microsoft III and A Response 
to Hylton and Salinger,” Antitrust Law Journal 70 (2002): 199-230; Keith N. Hylton and Michael A. 
Salinger, “Tying Law and Policy: A Decision Theoretic Approach,” Antitrust Law Journal 69 (2001): 469.  
13 Preliminary – Do not redistribute or cite without permission 
Given this general set-up, mixed bundling gives each group of customers the 
exact product its “members” want.  Assuming that there are at least some people in each 
of the three demand groups, anything other than mixed bundling represents a limitation 
on the set of products that are offered.  If the bundle is the “good” not offered, then no 
tying occurs.  If, however, the bundle is offered and one or both components are not, then 
the result is tying. 
As is generally recognized in the economics literature on product selection, 
companies cannot customize their offerings to the preferences of each customer because 
of scale economies associated with each product offering.  To be offered, therefore, the 
presence of some demand for a good is not sufficient.  There must be a critical mass of 
customers.  The simplest way to capture these scale economies is to assume a fixed cost 
associated with each product offering, where each component and the bundled product 
are separate offerings.  
The assumption of a fixed cost of a product offering poses a dilemma for 
modeling tying under competition.  Under perfect competition, price equals marginal 
cost.  With a fixed cost associated with each product offering, however, marginal cost is 
less than average cost, marginal cost pricing would not allow a firm to cover its cost.  
Rather than assuming perfect competition, therefore, we assume that markets are 
perfectly contestable in the sense of Baumol, Panzer, and Willig (1982).  We then model 
the set of products offered by looking for “sustainable prices.” 
To take an example, consider pure bundling, which means that the bundle is 
offered but neither component is.  When that happens, customers who want just good A 
or just good B have to buy the bundle and discard the good they do not want.  Under the 
14 Preliminary – Do not redistribute or cite without permission 
contestability assumption, the price of the bundle equals its average cost, which is the 
sum of the marginal cost and the fixed cost averaged over all the customers who buy it.  
For pure bundling to be sustainable, then it must not be possible to offer, say, just good A 
at a price below the price of the bundle under pure bundling.  If the marginal cost of good 
A is less than the marginal cost of the bundle, as would typically be the case, then pure 
bundling would not be sustainable given sufficiently large demand for good A.  If, 
however, demand for just good A is sufficiently limited, then the marginal cost savings 
from providing good A alone might be less than the fixed cost of the separate product 
offering.  If so, and if the same is true for good B, then pure bundling can be sustainable. 
Simple as the framework is, it leads to powerful insights.  In particular, pure 
bundling can occur under two distinct types of circumstances.  One is that most 
customers want both goods, there are marginal cost savings from offering them together, 
and demand for the separate goods, while present, is too small to justify offering them.  A 
commonly cited but trivial example is shoes—few people want their shoes without laces 
and few want only one shoe; but few does not mean none since surely some people have 
their favorite laces and there are at least a few amputees and people in casts who only 
want one shoe.  Men’s and women’s suits are an interesting example.  In the United 
States, tailoring is usually tied in for men, so men who have their own favorite tailor are 
perhaps disadvantaged; tailoring is usually not tied for women who sometimes complain 
that this is discriminatory.   
The other condition that gives rise to pure bundling in this model is that fixed 
costs are very high.  In this case, pure bundling can arise even if no one wants both 
components.  If so, everyone in effect purchases an unwanted component.  Yet, the high 
15 Preliminary – Do not redistribute or cite without permission 
fixed cost makes it efficient to provide a standardized product that meets the needs of a 
diverse group of customer wants.  For example, some computer software is sold in boxes 
that contain both a Macintosh and PC version.  It is likely that very few people want both.  
Many college textbooks contain more material than can be covered in a single course so 
that they can be useful for professors with diverse preferences about what material they 
want their students to read.           
We now turn to our empirical application of this framework. 
           
IV.  The Pricing of Pain Relief, Cold, Sinus, and Allergy Medicines 
 
The primary data collected for this paper were the prices of all cold
23 and pain relief 
medications sold at the Walgreens
24 at 757 N. Michigan Ave. in Chicago on April 3, 2003. 
For each package, we observe the brand, the price, dosage form,
25 quantity of each active 
ingredient per unit, and number of units. We have supplemented the data with some prices 
offered at the website of CVS
26 and have generally checked prices on the web and at other 
outlets to confirm that the regularities we document are not specific to this particular 
location and time. 
A. Empirical Regularities 
 
                                                 
23 We use the term “cold” to include medications labeled as sinus, allergy, and cough as well. 
24 Walgreens is the largest pharmacy chain in the United States. It has a 20 percent share of retail 
pharmaceuticals sales. CVS is the second largest pharmacy chain with a 16 percent share. Source: “CVS Is 
Good Medicine For Investors,” Dow Jones News Service, February 25, 2004. 
25 Dosage forms include tablets, caplets, liquid, “gel tabs,” etc. 
26 The website www.cvs.com is a vehicle for ordering pharamaceuticals (and other products) to be 
delivered by mail. The website is operated by CVS, which also operates a large chain of retail pharmacies. 
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   We will ultimately use a price regression to describe the bundle discount. To 
guide the specification of that regression, it will be useful to explore less formally some 
strong regularities that are present in the data.  We will use these stylized facts to argue 
for a cost-based explanation for the bundle discount.   
1.   Bundle Discounts and Brand Name Premia 
 
   Johnson & Johnson’s Tylenol is the dominant brand of the pain reliever 
acetaminophen and Pfizer’s Sudafed is the dominant brand of the decongestant 
pseudoephedrine hydrochloride. Each Extra Strength Tylenol contains 500 mg of 
acetaminophen and each Maximum Strength Sudafed contains 30 mg of pseudoephedrine 
hydrochoride. Johnson & Johnson does not offer a Tylenol-brand pseudoephedrine 
hydrochloride nor does Pfizer offer a Sudafed-brand acetaminophen. However, both a 
Tylenol Sinus Caplet and a Sudafed Sinus and Headache Caplet contain 30 mg of 
pseudoephedrine hydrochloride and 500 mg of acetaminophen.
27 Table 3.1 lists the prices 
we observed for 24-tablet packages of these products and for their store-brand 
equivalents.
28 Table 4.1 illustrates two general phenomena in the pricing of this class of 
product. First, branded products command a substantial premium over the price of the 
CVS product—from around 30 percent to 50 percent. Second, within both the branded 
and non-branded segments, the price of the combination product is much lower than the 
sum of the prices of the stand-alone products. The incremental cost to a consumer of the 
                                                 
27 Novartis also offers a product that contains 500 mg of acetaminophen and 30 mg of pseudoephedrine 
hydrochloride, Tavist Allery/Sinus/Headache. 
28 These data are taken from www.cvs.com rather than our Walgreens data set. To isolate the bundle 
discount, we need to hold package size constant. To do so, we need all six of the products in Table 4.1 (just 
acetaminophen, just pseudophedrine, and the combination tablet in branded and generic form) available in 
a common package size. Our Walgreens data set did not generate such a comparison, but the data we 
obained from the CVS website did. 
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pseudoephedrine hydrochloride in the Tylenol Sinus Caplet over purchasing just Extra 
Strength Tylenol is $2.00, which is only 44 percent of the price of buying a package of 24 
Sudafed tablets. The incremental price of the acetaminophen in the Sudafed Sinus and 
Headache Caplets is $1.40, which is 35 percent of the price of buying a package of 24 
Extra Strength Tylenol tablets. The comparisons are even more striking with the CVS 
products. The incremental price of the acetaminophen in the combination product over 
pseudoephedrine hydrochloride tablets is only $0.50, or 17 percent of the price of buying 
acetaminophen tablets separately.
29 
Table 4.1. Prices for 24 Tablet/Caplet Packages 
Brand Combination Pseudoephedrine HCl Alone Acetaminophen Alone
Tylenol $5.99 NA $3.99 
Sudafed $5.99 $4.59  NA
CVS $3.99 $3.49 $2.99   
 
Note:  Tylenol: “Tylenol Sinus Caplet” (the combination product) and “Tylenol Extra Strength Caplets.” 
Sudafed: “Sudafed Sinus and Headache Caplet” (the combination product) and “Sudafed Sinus & Cold.” 
CVS: “Non-Aspirin Sinus Caplets Maximum Strength” (the combination product), “Nasal Decongestant 
Tablets Maximum Strength,” and “Non-Aspirin Caplets Extra Strength.” NA denotes a combination that 
was not offered. Doses are 30 mg of pseudoephedrine hydrochloride and 500 mg of acetaminophen. 
Source:  Downloaded from CVS website, http://www.cvs.com, February 11, 2004. 
There are also products that combine pseudoephedrine hydrochloride and ibuprofen. 
Here, the comparisons are not quite as clean because we observed package sizes of 20 rather 
than 24 for the combination product. Still, as we will document in section II.A.3 below (and 
as is well known), the price per pill is generally a decreasing function of package size. Thus, 
comparing the price per pill of the bundled product with the sum of the prices per pill of the 
component products sold in somewhat larger packages understates the gains from bundling. 
 
                                                 
29 In our Walgreens data set, the comparable prices were $6.99 for 24 Tylenol Sinus tablets, $4.99 for 24 
Extra Tylenol tablets, and $6.79 for 24 Sudafed tablets. Thus, the price of the branded combination product 
was only $0.20 higher than the stand alone Sudafed product. For the Walgreens brands, the prices were 
$2.99 for 24 tablets of extra strength acetaminophen and $3.49 for 24 maximum strenght pseudoephedrine 
hydrochloride tablets. While we did not observe a Walgreens version that combined just these two active 
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We observed a price of $6.29 for a package of 20 Advil “Cold & Sinus” tablets, which is 
less than $0.32/tablet. To buy Advil and Maximum Strength Sudafed separately in 24-tablet 
packages, the sum of the prices per pill would be more than $0.49/tablet.
30 On a per-pill 
basis, the price of the bundled product was 64 percent of the price of the components. For 
the store-brand versions, the per-pill price of the bundled product was less than $0.21, which 
was 21 percent less than $0.27, the sum of the per-pill prices of the two separate products.
31 
The strong stylized fact that emerges from this set of comparisons is that the prices 
consumers pay for combinations of medicines—both branded and store-brand—are 
substantially less than the prices they would pay to buy the same active ingredients as 
separate medicines. Of course, consumers who want all the components of the combination 
medicines likely get convenience as well as the lower price. 
2.  Pricing of Different Dosages 
 
The phenomenon of lower prices for combining the same active ingredient into 
fewer pills and distinct packages that we observed with combination drugs applies to 
different doses of the same medicine. 
a) Pain Relievers 
 
Tylenol comes in three dosage forms for adults:
32 Regular Strength (325 mg/tablet), 
Extra Strength (500 mg/tablet), and Arthritis Strength (650 mg/tablet). In a sense, each 
                                                                                                                                                 
ingredients, we did observe a package of 24 tablets with these two ingredients and 25 milligrams of the 
antihistimine, Diphenhydramine HCl. The price was $3.99.  
30 The price we observed for 24 Advil tablets was $4.99. As reported in note 29, we observed a price of 
$6.79 at Walgreens for a package of 24 Sudafed tablets. 
31 The Walgreens products are WalProfem tablets (ibuprofen), WalPhed (pseudoephedrine hydrochloride) 
and WalProfem Cold & Sinus. The prices we observed were $4.29 for 20 WalProfem Cold & Sinus tablets, 
$2.99 for 24 WalProfem tablets, and $3.49 for 24 WalPhed tablets. 
32 It also comes in junior and children’s doses. 
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Arthritis Strength tablet is a bundle of two Regular Strength tablets. As a result, buying two 
packages of, say, 100 Regular Strength Tylenol rather than one package of 100 Extra 
Strength Tylenol is analagous to buying Tylenol and Sudafed separately rather than in 
"sinus tablet" form. 
Table 4.2 presents prices we observed that reveal the economies of combining 
products as well as the general pricing structure for Tylenol. First, note that in the two cases 
in which the number of tablets is held constant (50 and 100), the incremental price of the 
higher levels of extra ingredients is small. At the 50-tablet size, the arthritis strength contains 
30 percent more active ingredient for an incremental price of only $0.20, or 2.8 percent. At 
the 100-tablet size, the Arthritis Strength price is 10 percent higher than the Extra Strength 
price. In turn, Extra Strength contains approximately 50 percent more active ingredient than 
regular strength for an incremental price of $0.60 or 6.4 percent. The comparison that most 
corresponds to the bundling comparison in the previous section is between purchasing one 
package of 100 Arthritis Strength tablets and two packages of 100 Regular Strength Tablets. 
The amount of active ingredient is the same, but buying two packages of Regular Strength 
entails two packages rather than one and twice as many tablets. As Table 4.2 indicates, the 
price of the one Arthritis Strength package is $10.99 while the price of two Regular Strength 
packages is $18.78.
33 
                                                 
33 Note further that a package of 60 Extra Strength Tylenol has about the same active ingredient as 100 
Regular Strength and costs $1.50 less. 
20 Preliminary – Do not redistribute or cite without permission 
Table 4.2. Prices for Different Tylenol Dosages 
Regular Strength Extra Strength Arthritis Strength
(325 mg)  (500 mg)  (650 mg) 
50 $7.19 $7.39 
60 $7.89 





Source:  Prices observed at Walgreens at 757 N. Michigan Ave. in Chicago on April 3, 2003. 
 
 
Table 4.3 shows similar data for Walgreens’ acetaminophen. Here, the evidence is 
more mixed. The clean comparison that is comparable to the cold medicines is the 100-
tablet size. The total price of two packages of Regular Strength acetaminophen is $9.98, 
which is about 25 percent more than the $7.99 price of a single package of Arthritis 
Strength. However, it is not universally true that the per-milligram price of the arthritis 
strength is lower than the per-milligram price of the others.
34 
Table 4.3. Prices for Different Walgreens Acetaminophen Dosages and Package Sizes 
Regular Strength Extra Strength Arthritis Strength
(325 mg)  (500 mg)  (650 mg) 
24 $2.99 $3.99 
50 $5.49 
60 $3.99 
100 $4.99 $5.99 $7.99 
175 $7.99 





Source:  Prices observed at Walgreens at 757 N. Michigan Ave. in Chicago on April 3, 2003. 
 
                                                 
34 All but one of the prices in Table 4.3 are $0.01 less than an even dollar, with the other being $0.01 less 
than an integral multiple of $0.50. This feature of the pricing could be part of the explanation for why the 
price of Arthritis Strength does not show evidence of bundling efficiencies. For example, a price of $3.49 
for the package of 24 might not be sufficient to cover the incremental cost. Also, as we will discuss further 
below, if demand for this package size of Arthritis Strength is sufficiently low, then a higher margin might 
be needed to cover the fixed cost of the shelf space. 
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b)  Decongestants 
 
Pseudoephedrine hydrochloride comes in three dosage forms. “Maximum 
Strength” contains 30 mg per tablet. The “12-hour version” contains 120 mg per tablet 
and the “24-hour version” contains 240 mg per tablet. Table 3.4 lists the prices that we 
observed for different package sizes and dosage forms of Sudafed, Contac (another brand 
of pseudoephedrine hydrochloride) and Walgreens pseudoephedrine hydrochloride. Table 
4.4 provides one clean comparison that is analogous to the bundling analysis above. The 
price of one package of ten 24-hour Sudafed tablets is $9.99, whereas the sum of the 
prices of two packages of ten 12-hour Sudafed tablets is $12.98. Note further that the 
price of five 24-hour Sudafed tablets is somewhat less than the price of ten 12-hour 
tablets and that the price of ten 24-hour Sudafed tablets is somewhat less than the price of 
twenty 12-hour tablets. The differences are not large. However, the obvious source of 
cost savings from the 24-hour version concerns placing the medicine into tablets. Since 
the absolute difference in the number of tablets is small, one would not expect large cost 
differences.
35 
Table 4.4. Prices for Different Brands, Dosages and Package Sizes of Pseudoephedrine 
Hydrochloride 
30 mg/tablet 120 mg/tablet 240 mg/tablet
Number of Tablets Sudafed Walgreens Contac Sudafed Walgreens Sudafed
5 $5.99 
10 $6.79 $6.49 $3.99  $9.99 
20 $9.49 $10.49 $6.49 
24 $6.79 $3.49 
48 $9.49 $5.99 
96 $14.99   
 
Source:  Prices observed at Walgreens at 757 N. Michigan Ave. in Chicago on April 3, 2003. 
 
                                                 
35 Note that one odd feature of the table is that the price of 96 Walgreens Maximum Strength tablets is more 
than double the price of a package with half the number of tablets. That price is the exception, however. In 
general, the price per tablet is lower for larger package sizes. 
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3. Package  Size  Effects 
 
The third empirical regularity we document concerns package size, which is 
another form of bundling. A package of 200 tablets is a bundle of two packages of 100 
tablets. In addition to providing evidence of another source of gains from bundling, 
evidence on the prices of different package sizes will yield insights into the fixed costs of 
product offerings. 
Pain relief medications provide better evidence about package size effects than do 
decongestants or antihistamines because they come in a broader range of package sizes. 
Figure 4.1 presents the data on extra strength acetaminophen and Figure 4.2 presents the 
data on ibuprofen. Each graph contains two series, one for branded versions and one for 
the Walgreens product. All four of the series are concave and would appear to have a 
positive intercept. 
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B. Regression Results 
 
With the above results in hand, we now seek to estimate a single regression 
equation to characterize the gains consumers realize from purchasing bundled products. 
The data set we collected had 305 observations. However, these included a variety of 
dosage forms, such as tablets, liquids, and liqui-gels.  To avoid any misspecification from 
how we treat dosage forms, we restricted attention to tablets or delivery forms typically 
priced the same as tablets.
36 This eliminated a large fraction of the medicines containing 
cough suppressants. Also, the variety of active ingredients to treat coughs is substantially 
greater than the variety of decongestants, antihistamines, and pain relievers; we were 
24 
                                                 
36 This filter excluded any medicines in liquid or packet form as well as “liqui-gels,” which typically sell 
for a premium. It includes caplets. Preliminary – Do not redistribute or cite without permission 
concerned that we would be unable to get reliable estimates of how each cough 
suppressant is priced. As a result, we excluded cough medicines. More precisely, we 
restricted attention to tablets in which the active ingredients were limited to the pain 
relievers acetaminophen and ibuprofen, the decongestant pseudoephedrine hydrochloride, 
and the antihistamines chlorpheniramine maleate and diphenhydramine HCl.
37 This left 
us with 112 observations. 
In order to capture brand effects and the non-linearities in package size 
documented above, we chose the following specification: 
(1)    
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where: 
Pi is the price of package i 
Ti is the number of tablets in package i 
Bi is a brand name dummy for package i 
Zij is the amount of ingredient j in package i 
The presence of a brand premium raises issues for the effect of bundling in this 
case.
38 To see the general issue, consider Table 4.1. For the branded products, the bundle 
discount is computed as the price of Tylenol Sinus (or Sudafed Sinus Headache) with the 
sum of the prices of Tylenol Extra Strength and Sudafed Maximum Strength. Both of the 
 
37 Thus, we excluded medicines with cough suppressants. The products we observed contained a much 
greater variety of cough suppressants than of the other types of ingredients, and we were concerned that we 
did not have sufficient data to estimate with much accuracy the price effects of each cough suppressant. 
38 A log specification might seem superior for handling the brand premium.  There are two reasons, though, 
why a log specification is inappropriate for this application.  First, interpreting the intercept term as 
reflecting costs (in a way that will be made precise in the next section) requires a linear specification.  
Second, the separate ingredients presumably affect costs additively.  A log specification would presume 
that they do so multiplicatively.   
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prices of the component products include a brand premium.
39 Unless the price of the 
bundled product includes a double brand premium, then part of the bundle discount 
reflects a brand premium effect.
40 
Our specification allows the brand premium to be a quadratic function of the 
number of tablets. While this functional form allows for some flexibility in estimating 
how companies impose a brand premium, it does not allow the brand premium to be a 
function of the number of active ingredients. Neither does it allow for the brand premium 
to depend on the volume of active ingredient per tablet.
41 We ran regressions in which the 
brand premium could depend on the number of active ingredients. They provided no 
evidence that bundled, branded products command a higher (absolute) premium than do 
unbundled ones.
42 
                                                 
39 The fact that Tylenol is a Johnson & Johnson brand while Sudafed is a Pfizer brand is of interest, but a 
similar issue would arise if the same company owned both. 
40 As we will see, the brand effect accounts for a substantial piece of the bundle discount in this case. 
Exactly how to interpret this effect would require a better understanding of the source of brand premia than 
one can currently get from the economics literature. The branding effect could easily be the subject of an 
entire other paper. In this paper, we merely document the effect and leave its explanation as a potential 
avenue for future research. 
41 If, for example, one compares the three different strengths of Tylenol described above, it would be of 
interest to estimate whether the brand premium depends on the number of tablets or on the amount of 
acetaminophen. 
42 We believe that the branding effect of bundling is potentially of great interest in understanding branding, 
but we do not pursue it in more detail here because we suspect that it is not a common effect of bundling.     
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 IBi = ibuprofen in package i in units of 200 mgs 
 ACi = acetaminophen in package i in units of 500 mgs  
  PHi = pseudoephedrine hydrochloride in package i in units of 30 mgs  
 CMi = chlorpheneramine maleate in package i in units of 2 mgs 
 DIi = diphenhydramine in package i in units of 25 mgs 
 
The coefficients on the active ingredients are all positive, although only the ones 
on the pseudoephedrine HCl and diphenhydramine variables are significant.  The 
coefficients on the amount of acetaminophen and ibuprofen are small and imprecisely 
determined. That they are small makes sense. The price of both bulk acetaminophen and 
bulk ibuprofen is approximately $8/kg,
43 which would contribute $0.004 per 500 mg 
acetaminophen tablet and $0.0016 per 200 mg ibuprofen tablet. 
These regressions reveal three primary sources of gains to consumers from buying 
bundled products. The first is the intercept term of $2.31, which is highly statistically 
significant. The purchaser of the bundled product pays one fixed component in the price 
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term. Purchasers of the two separate products would pay two. The second source of gains 
is associated with the number of tablets. It is 0.029 Ti – 3.3 x 10
-5 Ti
2. Again, purchasers 
of the bundled product pay this component once. Purchasers of two separate products 
would pay it twice. This component of the savings comes to $0.67 for 24-tablet packages 
and $1.29 for 48-tablet packages. Thus, the cost-based savings absent of brand effects are 
$2.98 for 24 tablet packages and $3.60 for 48 tablet packages. The third source of gains 
applies only to purchasers of branded products. It is given by 0.63 + 0.54 Ti – 0.00012 
Ti
2. It amounts to $1.84 and $2.92 for 24-tablet and 48-tablet packages, respectively.
44 
 
V. Modeling the Bundle Discount 
 
 
This case was selected because it has features that our model is designed to 
capture.  The different medications can be (and are) sold both separately and in 
combination.  The assumption of diverse consumer preferences seems applicable.  To use 
the example in Table 4.1, some people have a headache and want just acetaminophen. 
Some people have a cold and want just a decongestant.  Some have a sinus headache and 
want both.
45  Because of savings in packaging, making tablets, and transactions expense, 
the marginal cost of the bundled product is less than the sum of the marginal costs of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
43 See http://www.the-innovation-group.com/ChemProfiles/Acetaminophen.htm and 
www.tulika.com/exportprices.htm  (accessed April 25, 2005). 
44 These estimates are for the savings from buying a bundled medicine with two active ingredients as 
compared with buying the components separately. The effect would be twice as large for products with 
three active ingredients as compared with buying all three separately. 
45 The model assumes that consumers who want just one component are willing to buy it as part of the 
bundle. In economics terminology, we assume free disposal. That plainly does not apply to this case. Many 
people with just a headache would no doubt prefer just a pain reliever to a pain reliever plus decongestant 
combination. 
28 Preliminary – Do not redistribute or cite without permission 
unbundled items.  Given that mixed bundling prevails,
46 fixed costs seem not to be so 
large as to prevent a good that people want from being offered.  Yet, some fixed cost is 
present.   Each additional stock-keeping unit (sku) imposes a cost on a retailer as it must 
order the product, maintain inventories, and so on.  In addition, each distinct product sold 
by a retailer must occupy a shelf slot. The cost of these slots is an example of what 
accountants refer to as “semi-fixed” or “step” costs. They are not fixed with respect to all 
levels of output, but they are incurred in discrete units (or “steps”). Whether or not such 
costs should be deemed primarily fixed or primarily marginal depends on the size of the 
steps relative to total demand. We do not have the information one would need to 
determine whether shelf space should be considered a fixed or marginal expense, but it is 
at least plausible that it is more nearly fixed.
47 
The substantial brand premia in the model might cast doubt on the applicability of 
the contestability assumption.  We have two responses.  First, our econometric 
specification allows us to estimate the size of the brand premium and thereby remove it 
from our estimate of costs.  Second, even if, say, Tylenol is a dominant brand in 
acetaminophen, a monopoly model may not be the best for understanding its pricing 
behavior.  Like any modeling assumption, the contestability assumption is meant as an 
approximation, not literal truth.  The implication of the assumption is that prices are 
                                                 
46 This comment requires some qualification. To take one example, Johnson & Johnson sells 
acetaminophen alone and acetaminophen in combination with pseudoephedrine HCl. It does not sell 
pseudoephedrine HCl alone. While this is technically tying from the standpoint of the company, the market 
outcome does not entail tying. One can purchase pseudoephedrine HCl. Moreover, because Johnson & 
Johnson does sell Tylenol without any additional active ingredients, its tying is not the sort that could raise 
antitrust concerns. 
47 One relevant piece of information is the number of shelf slots devoted to an item. In grocery stores in the 
United States, it is common to observe multiple slots devoted to two-liter bottles of Coca-Cola, and the 
number of slots increases when Coca-Cola is a sale item. In that case, the shelf space should be treated as a 
marginal cost. When just one shelf slot is devoted to an item, there is a stronger case for treating shelf space 
as a fixed cost. 
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driven primarily by costs with the elasticity of demand playing a less important role.  The 
rationale for the assumption is that the firm faces enough competitive constraints from 
both actual competition (other pain relievers like ibuprofen and generic acetaminophen) 
and potential competition (other pharmaceutical companies that are plainly capable of 
producing the product) to place strict limits on the extent to which prices can exceed 
costs.   
The choice between a competitive model and a monopoly model is particularly 
crucial because the result we are most interested in explaining is the bundle discount.  We 
interpret the bundle discount as reflecting costs.  The models of bundling as price 
discrimination might seem to suggest an alternative, demand-based explanation.  In 
comparing the competing explanations, one must be clear on what the model must 
explain.  The key stylized fact we have established is not just that there is a bundle 
discount, but that it is so large.  A cost-based model provides a simple explanation.  Since 
the active ingredients represent a small portion of the cost of the product, the cost of 
producing and selling a package of tablets with, say, acetaminophen and pseudophedrine 
hydrochloride is only slightly greater than the cost of producing and selling a package of 
tablets with acetaminophen alone.  Because the bundled products likely provide 
convenience, we question whether a monopoly price discrimination model would imply a 
bundle discount (as opposed to a premium) at all, much less one as steep as the one we 
observe.       
In any event, our primary purpose here is not to assert that the model is a 
complete explanation but, rather, to advance the techniques for assessing whether the set 
of product offerings is optimal.  Even assuming that the bundle discount is cost-based, its 
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welfare implications are more complicated than one might initially expect.  To see this 
point, we need to present the model more formally.                    
In the simplest version,
48 let X1 be the number of people who want just good 1, X2 
be the people who want just good 2, and XB be the number of people who want both. Let 
F be the fixed cost of a product offering, c1 and c2 be the marginal cost of goods 1 and 2, 
respectively, and cB be the marginal cost of the bundle with cB ≤ c1 + c2. Letting p1, p2, 
and pB be the prices of goods 1 and 2 and of the bundle, then the contestable prices are: 





=+ ∈ B  
and the discount for the bundle (DB) is given by: 
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As equation (4) makes clear, there are two possible sources of the bundle discount. One is 
marginal cost savings, c1 + c2 - cB. The other concerns fixed costs. A customer who buys 
the two components separately contributes to two fixed costs; the purchaser of the 
bundled product only contributes to one.  
Without knowing X1, X2, and XB, we cannot be sure that the bundle discount is 
attributable at all to fixed costs. As a practical matter, however, it likely is. To cover its 
costs, a retailer must “mark up” the prices of the items it sells. Unless the retail mark-up 
on the bundled item is at least the sum of its mark-ups on the components—and there is 
no reason to suppose that it is—then part of the customer savings reflects retail mark-ups. 
                                                 
48 In this version, demand by each group is treated as being perfectly inelastic within the range of prices 
that might prevail. See the appendix to David S. Evans and Michael A. Salinger, “The Role of Cost in 
Determining When Firms Offer Bundles and Ties” (2004 Working paper, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=550884) for an extension to price-sensitive demand. 
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A key result in Evans and Salinger (2004) is that mixed bundling can occur even 
if it is not the set of offerings that minimizes total costs. Under mixed bundling, there has 
to be a bundle discount,
49 but the private savings from the bundle discount do not 
necessarily represent social savings. If we let SB be the cost savings from offering the 
bundle
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The first three terms of (5), which reflect marginal costs, are identical to (4). With the 
marginal costs, private savings reflect social savings. The last term of (5) is also the last 
term of (4). There is a social fixed cost of offering the bundle that must be subtracted 
from the marginal cost savings. In a contestable market, purchasers of the bundle bear 
this cost as well. The difference between (4) and (5) comes from the two terms in (4) that 
reflect the average fixed costs of the two component goods. If those who want both 
components were to buy them separately, the prices they would pay would reflect these 
fixed costs. When they buy the bundle instead, they get a private benefit from not 
contributing to those fixed costs, but there is no corresponding social benefit because the 
fixed costs of the components are not reduced.  
The last part of equation (5) provides a simple approach to inferring the cost 
savings from the bundle (under mixed bundling) from the bundle discount. It says that the 
cost savings (per consumer of the bundle) are the bundle discount minus the average 
fixed cost portion of the prices of the two separate goods. 
                                                 
49 Otherwise, consumers who want both components would not buy the bundle. 
50 SB represents the savings from offering the bundle given that goods 1 and 2 are also offered. 
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The following pair of examples illustrates the point: 
Example 1:  c1 = c2 = 2, cB = 2.9, F = 0, X1 = X2 = XB = 100 
 
Example 2:  c1 = c2 = 1, cB = 1.9, F = 100, X1 = X2 = XB = 100 
 
In both cases, the unique sustainable outcome is mixed bundling with p1 = p2 = 2 and pB = 
2.9.
51 The bundle discount is substantial. In example 1, the bundle discount entirely reflects 
social savings. The total cost of meeting demand with mixed bundling is 690. The cost of 
meeting demand with components selling would be 800, or 110 more. In example 2, the 
total cost of meeting demand with mixed bundling is also 690, just as in example 1. In 
contrast to example 1, however, the total cost of meeting demand with components selling 
would be only 600.
52 Unless the bundled product provides convenience for the customers 
who want both items, the mixed bundling would be inefficient despite the substantial bundle 
discount. 
A similar point applies to the individual components. Under mixed bundling, the 
price of each component has to be less than the price of the bundle,
53 but that does not 
imply that offering the separate good lowers costs. If we let DCi and SCi be the discount 
                                                 
51 This point should be obvious for example 1. For example 2, the prices under pure components selling 
would be $1.50 (calculated as 1 + 100/200) for each item. Customers who buy both pay a total of $3. This 
outcome is not sustainable because it is susceptible to entry with the bundle at a price of $2.9. Similarly, 
pure bundling is not sustainable. The price under pure bundling would be 2.9 + 100/300 ≈ 3.23.  That price 
is not sustainable because an entrant could break even selling either component at a price of $3. 
52 In example 2, there are some marginal cost savings from bundling. If there were no marginal cost savings 
from bunding, then  mixed bundling would still be sustainable (and inefficient), but it would not be the 
unique sustainable outcome. Components selling would be sustainable as well. Mixed bundling can be the 
unique sustainable outcome with no marginal cost savings from bundling if XB is greater than the 
geometric mean of X1 and X2. For a more complete explanation, see David S. Evans and Michael A. 
Salinger, “The Role of Cost in Determining When Firms Offer Bundles and Ties” (2004 Working paper, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=550884). 
53 Another simplifying assumption of our model is that consumers who want just one of the goods get no 
utility or disutility from the other good. As a result, they view the bundle as a perfect substitute for the good 
they want. That assumption does not apply to our application, since, for example, many consumers who 
want just a pain reliever would prefer not to have to take a decongestant as well. Just as it would be easy to 
incorporate a convenience value for the bundle in the model, we could also assume that consumers who 
want just one component are willing to pay a premium not to have it bundled with the other. 
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and cost savings (per customer of good i) of offering good i (given that the bundle is 
offered), we have: 
(6) 
i B














c c SC − = − − =  
 Equation (7) says that to infer the cost savings from having a component available 
separately, one must subtract the average fixed cost component of the price of the bundled 
good from the component discount. 
Referring back to our pricing regression, the bundle discount has three 
components: the intercept, the coefficients on the tablet variables, and the coefficients on 
the brand-name variables. As noted above, we focus on the first two. The estimated 
equation distinguishes between price components that are fixed and variable with respect 
to package size. Within our model, however, the key distinction is whether or not the 
costs are fixed or marginal with respect to a customer. The cost of placing active 
ingredients into tablets and, to some extent, the cost of the package itself, are examples of 
costs that are marginal with respect to both package size and to the customer. To the 
extent that package costs rise less than proportionately with the number of tablets, 
however, then, part of packaging cost would be reflected in our intercept term. Even 
though this component is fixed with respect to package size, it is variable with respect to 
the customer.
54 Another example of this kind of cost is the cost of the time it takes a clerk 
                                                 
54 Our argument that the packaging cost is reflected at least partially in the intercept term does not require 
that the packaging cost equation literally has a positive intercept. If we observed packaging costs directly, 
our estimates of the marginal cost savings from bundling would be based on the cost of a package of a 
given size, such as 24 tablets or 48 tablets. Taken, literally, the intercept reflects the cost of a 0-tablet 
package, which is irrelevant for computing the gains from bundling. Given our choice of a quadratic 
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to process a transaction. Finally, some costs are fixed both with respect to the customer 
and to the size of the package. The costs of having an additional sku and, to a large 
extent, the cost of shelf space are examples.
55 
VI.  Decomposing Fixed and Marginal Cost Effects with Package Size 
Pricing Regularities   
 
We now show how to use the package-size regularities documented in Section IV 
to  decompose the bundle and component discounts into marginal cost and fixed cost 
components. This decomposition will then allow us to measure the (possibly negative) 
cost savings (per customer) from each product. 
Our interpretation of quantity discounts as being cost-based raises issues similar 
to whether the bundle discount reflects costs or price discrimination.  The theory of 
quantity dependent monopoly pricing would seem to provide an alternative explanation.  
As with the bundle discount, there are several responses.  First, costs provide a 
compelling explanation.  The pills themselves represent a relatively small fraction of the 
cost.  Packaging costs appear to be significant and subject to scale economies.  Many 
aspects of the transaction cost would seem to be independent of the size of the package.  
Second, all the products come in a relatively small number of package sizes, which is the 
phenomenon that we exploit.  Even in a monopoly model, it would be hard to explain that 
without reference to some fixed cost of a product offering.  Third, consider 
pseudophederine hydrochloride, which generally comes in packages of 24 and 48.  It 
seems hard to rule out the possibility that some people would like to buy 72.  Theories of 
                                                                                                                                                 
functional form, however, the cost of a pacakge of a particular size would be reflected in part in the 
intercept. 
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non-linear pricing would generally predict that they should be given a lower price per 
tablet than the people who wish to purchase 48.  Whether they bought one package of 48 
and one of 24 or two packages of 48, their price per pill that they want would be higher 
than for people who wish to purchase 48 tablets.   
A. Theory 
 
   The key to understanding the size of the the product-specific fixed costs is to 
observe products that could conceivably exist but do not.
56 In the cases we have 
considered, product tying does not occur. Among the products sold in bundled form that 
we have considered, all the component medicines are available separately. Rather than 
looking to products that do not exist, we look to package sizes that are not offered. The 
price-package size relationships presented in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 provide evidence of 
economies of package size. As a consequence, customers who want a large quantity are 
better off buying one large package than several smaller ones. However, not all possible 
package sizes are offered. For example, the Walgreens in question sold Extra Strength 
Tylenol in packages of 24, 100, 150, 200, and 225. It did not, however, sell packages of 
175. There does not seem to be any reason to suppose that there were no customers who 
would most prefer to buy 175. Such a customer must choose between buying a package 
                                                                                                                                                 
55 It is possible that some costs might be variable with respect to package size but fixed with respect to the 
customer. This could happen if, for example, larger packages require more shelf space. Our procedure for 
estimating the component of price that covers fixed costs ignores this possibility. 
56 Other papers that use or suggest an analogous approach to estimating fixed costs are Timothy F. 
Bresnahan and Peter C. Reiss, “Do Entry Conditions Vary Across Markets?” Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity: Special Issue on Microeconomics (3) (1987): 833-871; Ariel Pakes and Paul McGuire, 
“Computing Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibria: Numerical Implications of a Dynamic Differentiated Product 
Model,” RAND Journal of Economics 25(4) (1994): 555-589e; Richard Ericson and Ariel Pakes, “Markov-
Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for Empirical Work.” ReStud 62 (1) (1995): 53–82; Chaim 
Fershtman and Ariel Pakes, “A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars,” RAND Journal of 
Economics 31(2) (2000): 207-236;  Eugenio Miravete, “Are all those Calling Plans Really Necessary?  The 
Limited Gains From Complex Tariffs” (CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4237, 2004); Ariel Pakes, Michael 
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of 200 and wasting 25 of them or buying a package of 150 and supplementing the 
package of 150 with, say, another package of 24.
57 Given the economies of package size, 
neither of these solutions would give the customer as good a price as he would get if a 
package of 175 were available on the market. 
To estimate the cost factor that prevents the package of 175 from being introduced,   
we need to introduce some theory that extends the contestability analysis from our previous 
paper. The general approach is to view the set of products offered and their prices as a 
sustainable market outcome, which means that entry with another product (in this case, a 
different package size) is not profitable. Let Qi, Yi, and Pi be the package size, number of 
purchasers, and price of package i for i = 1 or 2 with Q1 <  Q2. Let C(.) be the marginal cost 
of selling a package of a particular size to an extra customer. Then, the contestability result 
that price equals average cost implies: 






Let Q be the average of Q1 and Q2, and assume that if Q were offered at a lower price, half 










We now need to make the simplifying assumptions that Q1 and Q2  are close enough to each 
other that a linear approximation of the marginal cost function is reasonable and that Y1=Y2. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ostrovsky, and Steven T Berry,  “Simple Estimators for the Parameters of Discrete Dynamic Games (with 
Entry/Exit Samples)” (NBER Working Paper No. W10506, 2004). 
57 This choice would, of course, leave the consumer one pill short of his desired quantity. 
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With these additional assumptions, it is straightforward to show that the condition that 












The left-hand side of (10) is the component of the price that goes to covering the 
fixed cost. Each successive pair of package sizes yields an estimate. Figure 6.1 shows a 
histogram of our estimates of the lower bounds of the fixed costs taken from the data 
underlying Figures 4.1 and 4.2. The mean value is $1.33, the median is $1.20, and the 
modal range is $1.00 to $1.50. Taking the median as our estimate, we estimate that $1.20 
of each package price represents a contribution to fixed costs. 
                                                 
58 This condition only insures that the existing offering is sustainable with respect to entry half way 
between two package sizes that are offered. More generally, one might impose the condition that the 
offering be sustainable with respect to all possible intermediate package sizes. In doing so, however, one 
would probably not make our simplifying assumptions about marginal cost and demand.        
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In Section II, we estimated a cost-based savings
59 of $2.98 and $3.60 for 24-count 
and 48-count packages of tablets with two active ingredients. Given our estimate of $1.20 
as the part that reflects a contribution to fixed costs, the implied marginal cost savings are 
$1.78 and $2.40. Using equation (5), we estimate that the cost savings per customer from 
the bundled products are $0.58 and $1.20, respectively.  
Both the private and net savings would be larger for tablets that combine three 
active ingredients. The private savings are twice as large, so they are $5.96, which 
reflects $3.56 in marginal cost savings and $2.40 in average fixed cost. From the 
39 
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marginal cost savings of $3.56, which represents a social benefit, we must subtract the 
$1.20 average fixed cost of the additional offering. The net cost savings are $2.36. 
The gains from bundling would also be larger for larger packages. For example, 
for packages of 48 tablets, our regression equation implies private gains of $3.60 and 
$7.20 for tablets that combine two ingredients and three ingredients, respectively. The net 
effect on costs would then be savings of $1.20 and $3.60 for the bundled products.
60 
We can also use equation (8) to estimate whether there are cost savings from 
offering the stand-alone products. Consider again the example in Table 4.1. The 
regression results indicate that for people who want just acetaminophen, the marginal 
cost of buying acetaminophen bundled with pseudoephedrine hydrochloride would be 
$0.065 ⋅ 24 = $1.56. As this exceeds our estimate of the average fixed cost of $1.20, we 
estimate the cost savings from having the stand-alone acetaminophen product to be $0.36. 
For consumers who want just pseudoephedrine hydrochloride, the regression results 
imply that the marginal cost of buying it bundled with acetaminophen would be $0.012 ⋅ 
24 = $0.29. As this incremental cost is less than the average fixed cost, it would lower 
costs not to offer the 24-tablet package of just pseudoephendrine hydrochloride. In other 





                                                 
60 The calculations are $3.60 – 2 ⋅ $1.20 = $1.20 and $7.20 – 3 ⋅ $1.20 = $3.60. 
61 Assuming that the groups that want just pseudoephedrine HCl and that want the bundled product are of 
equal size, tying would also be sustainable. By pricing the bundled product to attract the group that wants 
just the decongestant, the average fixed costs could be reduced from $1.20 to $0.60. This $0.60 price 
reduction would more than offset the $0.29 marginal cost associated with the extra active ingredient. 
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VII.  Conclusions  
 
Any economist who looks at the state of debate on the anticompetitive use of 
tying should find it quite unsettling.  On the one hand, there is an economics literature 
that assumes away all efficiencies and documents, unsurprisingly in light of modern 
game theory, that it is possible to locate assumptions under which tying is 
anticompetitive.  We have no doubt that firms can sometimes engage in tying that 
reduces consumer welfare, but the economics literature is not much help in identifying 
these situations.  On the other hand, there is a case law that places much of the weight of 
the tying analysis on whether a product is a single product or a tie of two separate 
products.  The Jefferson Parish test seems to suggest that one mainly needs to look at 
whether there is material demand for the tied product. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
provided an elegant (although only weakly supportive) rationale for this test:  it is 
supposed to be a proxy for whether the “tie” is efficient or not; if there is no demand then 
the markets have revealed that a single product consisting of the tying and tied goods is 
efficient.  Little thought is required to come up with countless examples that demonstrate 
that this is not a powerful test (i.e., it leads to many errors).  Competitive markets provide 
shoes with shoelaces, cars with tires, men’s suits with tailoring, newspapers with 
television listings, and so forth. 
Economists might criticize the courts for sloppy analysis, but one looks at the 
economics literature in vain to see our profession providing the antitrust authorities or the 
courts with much useful guidance.  There is a vast gulf between the Chicago School view 
that “there’s a single monopoly profit so it must be efficient” to the game theoretic view 
that “without efficiencies it could be anticompetitive.”  In between, there is essentially no 
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empirical evidence that would explain what product configurations emerge in reasonably 
competitive markets.  And one sees this divide in the court cases in which defendants 
offer explanations for tying that are based on little empirical analysis, or theoretical 
reasoning, and which courts and antitrust authorities quickly dismiss as being gratuitous 
(see our earlier discussion of Jefferson Parish). 
Our contribution in this chapter and our companion articles is twofold.  First, we 
have provided a theoretical framework that, while admittedly being based on assumptions 
that one can question and future work should modify, can be empirically implemented.  
Second, and this is the specific purpose of this paper, we have shown how it is possible to 
estimate the key primitives of the model at least for the example we have chosen—
namely the extent of offering-specific fixed and variable costs of a product.  Both the 
framework and the empirical results highlight the importance of the fixed cost of offering 
particular product configurations in “pretty competitive” markets.  Costs play a more 
central role in this analysis than in the existing literature. 
Of course, this trilogy of articles provides only a first step.  On the theoretical 
side, alternatives to the contestability assumption need to be explored and it would be 
useful to embed the analysis in a model in which the degree of market power could vary.  
On the empirical side, we see two priorities.  One is to improve the estimates of the fixed 
costs of product offerings.
62  The other is to estimate the convenience value from 
bundling and unbundling.
63  Neither will be easy; but given that the theory identifies 
                                                 
62 We acknowledge that the approach we use in this paper is crude. 
63 The difficulty of doing so in this case is that when customers can buy bundled goods at a discount, it is 
hard to observe how much more they would be willing to pay for the bundled product if they had to.  In 
theory, one could estimate the convenience premium indirectly by combining the increased quantity 
demanded with the elasticity of demand, but neither of those would be easy to estimate either.    
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these factors as being key to both the private decision to bundle and tie and to the welfare 
analysis of these practices, some effort to overcome the challenges is warranted.  
The general approach we have applied to tying could be usefully applied to other 
business practices that are sometimes questioned as being anticompetitive.  That 
approach involves developing a positive theory for why certain practices emerge in 
“pretty competitive” environments and ascertaining the extent to which efficiency helps 
explain those practices.  The theory is designed to encourage empirical investigation. 
At this stage of development this approach is subject to the same criticism as the 
game-theoretic work on tying.  Just as that approach assumes efficiency away, our 
approach assumes anticompetitive explanations away.  Over time, industrial organization 
economists need to develop theories that can account for both pro-competitive and anti-
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